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The Surprising Benefits of Mandatory Hedge Fund Disclosure 
Colleen Honigsberg 
 
Regulators have long disagreed whether regulation would reduce hedge funds’ financial 
misreporting. On the one hand, critics have stated that hedge funds are unlikely to misreport because their 
investors are highly sophisticated financial players who can detect and deter financial misconduct. On the 
other hand, recent changes in the composition of hedge funds’ investors have led many to question this 
argument. In this paper, I test whether hedge fund regulation reduces misreporting by using a quasi-natural 
experiment in which a subset of hedge funds was regulated, deregulated, and then regulated again. Unique 
features of the setting permit me to study not only whether hedge fund regulation reduces financial 
misreporting—but, if so, why the regulation reduces misreporting. The results show that regulation reduces 
misreporting at hedge funds and that the imposition of disclosure requirements, even without other 
concurrent changes in regulation, can reduce hedge funds’ misreporting. The result seems surprising, 
because hedge funds’ investors are commonly thought to have access to far more information than is 
required by disclosure rules. Further inquiries suggest that disclosure requirements led funds to make 
changes in their internal governance, and that these changes in governance induced funds to report their 
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Hedge fund regulation has long been a controversial topic. Hedge funds’ investors are 
commonly considered to be highly sophisticated financial players, leading many influential 
policymakers to argue that hedge fund regulation is unnecessary because their investors will detect 
and deter financial misconduct without government assistance. The changing nature of the hedge 
fund industry has caused many to question this argument, however. Growth in hedge funds has 
outpaced growth of investment funds overall, and hedge funds now oversee more than $3 trillion 
in capital—a sum that has caused regulators to express concern that hedge funds could affect 
overall financial stability (SEC Report, 2003). Furthermore, hedge funds were once considered to 
cater solely to wealthy individuals, but the majority of hedge funds’ investors are now institutional 
investors such as pensions and universities—individuals only account for an estimated 3.6% of 
total capital (MFA, 2014).  
In contrast to an individual who invests her own capital, institutional investors are often 
thought to suffer from the “double agency problem” that results when an institution invests on 
behalf of an individual (Karantininis and Nilsson, 2011). According to this theory, institutional 
investors, such as the pension funds and universities that invest in hedge funds, may not be 
incentivized to fully detect and deter wrongdoing because the separation of client and investor 
creates an agency problem that is similar to the agency problem between a firm’s managers and 






fraud, they have different incentive structures that may lead them to place different relative values 
on, for example, investment in a high risk/high-reward fund. These differing incentives can be 
especially exacerbated if the investor needs to meet a performance target.  
  There have been a series of legal changes in response to the developments in the hedge 
fund industry. In particular, since 2004, hedge funds have experienced three significant changes 
that caused a subset of funds to be regulated, deregulated, and regulated once again. As with public 
companies, a fund that becomes regulated will be subject to a number of concurrent changes—
specifically, a regulated fund becomes subject to government inspections, compliance 
requirements, and mandatory public disclosure. However, an unusual feature of hedge fund 
regulation is that there are different tiers of regulation, and funds regulated under different tiers 
became subject to different types of regulation. For example, one tier of funds was subjected to 
only mandatory disclosure rules. And another became subjected to only government inspections.  
  This unique setting allows for study on whether hedge fund regulation reduces 
misreporting—and, if so, why it reduces misreporting. My study points to three key findings. First, 
hedge fund regulation reduces misreporting. Across all three legal changes, misreporting decreased 
upon regulation and increased upon deregulation. Second, I provide evidence that the decrease in 
misreporting was driven by mandatory disclosure requirements. When I group the funds by the 
type of regulation to which they became subject, I find that only the funds subject to disclosure 
significantly decreased misreporting. Notably, funds only subject to disclosure requirements 






significant effect. Finally, to understand why mandatory disclosure would decrease misreporting, 
I contacted personnel at funds in my sample and ran additional empirical tests based on their 
feedback. The evidence indicates that mandatory public disclosure of governance information, 
such as whether or not the fund is audited or employs a compliance officer, spurred internal 
governance changes at the funds that induced them to report more accurately.  
  All tests are difference-in-differences regressions that compare the hedge funds affected 
by the regulatory changes to a control group of funds that were already regulated by the SEC before 
the adoption of mandatory regulation. I further include a battery of robustness tests to address 
sample selection concerns. To identify misreporting at hedge funds, I follow prior literature and 
test for three suspicious patterns in the monthly performance returns that hedge funds report to 
commercial databases. First, I use the size of a fund’s “kink” at zero—that is, the unexpected 
number of small gains relative to the number of small losses—because prior literature has shown 
that it is the best predictor of detected fraud at hedge funds (Bollen and Pool, 2012). Second, 
following Agarwal et al. (2011), I determine whether the fund engages in “cookie jar” accounting 
by testing whether the fund reports abnormally high returns in December. Third, I rely on literature 
showing that Benford’s Law predicts misreporting (e.g., Amiran et al., 2015) and test whether the 
fund returns conform to Benford’s Law. 
  My paper contributes to several areas of literature. First, I contribute to the literature on 
mandatory disclosure—and, in particular, to the literature on the first-time effects of mandatory 






1969; 1973; Daines and Jones, 2012) are necessarily limited because disclosure for US public 
corporations has been federally mandated since the 1930s.1 Instead, to study the effect of 
disclosure in recent periods, most studies on US firms are forced to examine the effects of 
mandating additional disclosures on firms that are already subject to mandatory disclosure. 
Because extensive disclosures are already required, the marginal effect of these additional 
disclosures is likely to be small, making it difficult to understand the economic magnitude 
associated with disclosure requirements (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008; 2016). By using hedge funds, 
I have a unique setting that allows for study on the first-time effects of mandatory securities 
disclosure in a recent period.  
Second, my study is related to the literature disentangling the effects of different regulatory 
components. Empirical study on the relative effects of different types of regulation is difficult 
because there are usually multiple changes at once. Moreover, it is difficult to study each change 
in isolation because different components necessarily depend on one another: The benefits of 
mandatory disclosure and enforcement, for example, depend on the strength of the other (Barth 
and Israeli, 2013). Although some prior literature has examined the relative effects of different 
types of regulation on public companies (e.g., Christiansen et al., 2013), I am not aware of any 
empirical study of the different regulatory components at investment funds. The need for empirical 
                                                 
1 There are a limited number of studies that analyze the effect of first-time disclosure for OTC firms, which occurred 
in a more recent period (e.g., Ferrell, 2003; Bushee and Leuz, 2005). However, the imposition of disclosure 
requirements in the OTC market, although the most significant regulatory change when it was imposed, occurred 






work in this area is striking because regulators have long questioned whether lessons from public 
companies can be applied to investment funds (Greenspan, 1998). 
  Finally, I contribute to the literature on hedge fund regulation. A limited number of prior 
studies, generally using association designs, have provided evidence that regulation decreases 
misreporting at hedge funds (Hoffman, 2013; Cumming and Dai, 2010; Dimmock and Gerken, 
2015). My initial findings showing the regulation reduces misreporting are consistent with these 
studies, but I extend the initial inquiry of whether regulation reduces misreporting and instead 
focus on why regulation is effective.  
My paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the institutional background of 
hedge fund regulation. Section 3 describes the data sources and research design. Section 4 
describes the proxies for misreporting. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis showing that 
hedge fund regulation reduces misreporting. Section 6 examines why such regulation reduces 
misreporting. Section 7 presents the robustness tests, and Section 8 concludes the paper. 




The regime regulating hedge funds is distinct from that for public companies and has been 
recently subject to a tumultuous series of changes.2 Between 2004 and 2010, groups of hedge funds 
                                                 
2 Hedge funds are commonly defined as funds that utilize the exemptions found in either Section 3(c)(1) or Section 
3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. All investors in such funds must be, at a minimum, “accredited 






were, first, made subject to significant regulation by the SEC; second, relieved by the courts of 
these regulatory obligations; and third, again made subject to regulation, this time by Congress. In 
this section, I describe these recent changes and provide detail on the major components of hedge 
fund regulation. 
1. The SEC’s “Hedge Fund Rule.” The SEC took a largely “hands off” approach to hedge 
fund regulation until the collapse of Long Term Capital Management L.P. (“LTCM”), a prominent 
hedge fund, in 1998. Following the collapse of LTCM, the SEC became concerned that hedge 
funds could pose systemic risk to the entire financial system and took actions that set off a series 
of regulatory changes.3 
The first change occurred in 2004, when the SEC proposed to subject the vast majority of 
unregulated hedge funds to federal regulation for the first time (HF Rule, 2004). The rule, 
nicknamed the Hedge Fund Rule, closed a commonly used exemption that many hedge funds relied 
upon to avoid regulation under the Investment Advisers Act (“IAA”).4  The SEC adopted the 
                                                 
have at least $1 million in net worth, or a $200,000 annual salary, to qualify as an “accredited investor”). Most funds 
also seek to avoid the costs of Exchange Act regulation. To do so, the funds must have fewer than 2,000 investors 
(recently updated by the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act). 
 
3 The changes in law were imposed on hedge fund advisory firms (i.e., investment advisors) rather than the funds, but 
I use the term funds for ease of exposition. In my setting, the advisor and fund were substantively the same entity.  
 
4 At the time this rule was proposed, Section 203(b)(3) of the IAA exempted advisors that did not hold publicly hold 
themselves out as investment advisors, did not advise a registered investment company, and had fewer than 15 
“clients” over the past twelve months. Under this exemption, “client” was defined to include only direct investors, 
allowing funds to avoid regulation by using a legal structure in which investors placed their money in sub-funds that 
invested in the parent fund rather than investing in the parent fund directly. The Hedge Fund Rule redefined client to 






Hedge Fund Rule in December 2004, and the newly regulated funds were required to submit to 
the SEC’s authority by February 1st, 2006. The rule was highly controversial and had a widespread 
effect—indeed, it was estimated that fewer than half of hedge funds were regulated by the SEC 
before the adoption of the Hedge Fund Rule (CBS, 2004).   
2. Goldstein v. SEC. In response to the SEC’s adoption of the Hedge Fund Rule, the newly 
regulated hedge funds sued the SEC. In a closely watched lawsuit, Phillip Goldstein of Bulldog 
Investors alleged that the SEC had overstepped its authority. In June 2006, the DC Circuit agreed 
and vacated the Hedge Fund Rule. In August 2006, the SEC stated that it would not appeal the DC 
Circuit’s decision, making clear that the funds subjected to SEC regulation by the Hedge Fund 
Rule would be allowed to withdraw from such regulation (Cox, 2006).  
 3. The Dodd-Frank Act. Congress responded in the Dodd-Frank Act (“DFA”). Although 
the DFA included a complex series of provisions in this area, for present purposes I only highlight 
two changes. First, the DFA mandated that most hedge funds would again be subject to regulation 
(DFA Rule, 2011). This change required many unregulated funds—including those that had 
previously withdrawn from regulation after the Goldstein decision—to submit to regulation. 
Second, the DFA created different tiers of regulation, where funds that became regulated under 
different tiers became subject to different types of regulation. I describe these different tiers of 







B. Components of Hedge Fund Regulation 
 
To understand what it means for a fund to be “regulated,” I briefly summarize the major 
components of SEC regulation.5  As a technical matter, when I say that a fund becomes 
“regulated,” it means that the fund’s advisor must register with the proper authority—an act that 
subjects the entity to regulatory requirements.  
1. Mandatory disclosure. Most investment advisors in the US are required to disclose 
extensive information to the public in a filing known as Form ADV. Form ADV requires annual 
disclosure on a wide range of governance matters, including the firm’s clients, accounting 
practices, potential conflicts of interest, and prior disciplinary history. Notably, the information in 
Form ADV relates to the firm’s governance—not its financial performance.  
Although Form ADV has received limited attention from academics, the disclosure gives 
investors important information about their advisors. For example, some 21% of the advisors in 
my dataset disclosed a crime or regulatory infraction. Another 28% disclosed that they are not 
audited at least annually by an independent public accountant. And 14% disclosed a that the fund 
                                                 
5 It is important to note that there are safeguards in place to prevent even unregulated funds from defrauding their 
clients. Both regulated and unregulated funds are subject to antifraud rules, meaning that unregulated funds can be 
inspected—and regulators can bring enforcement actions—if there is reason to believe the fund is committing fraud. 








engages in transactions that could cause a significant potential conflict of interest (defined as funds 
that participate in either principal transactions or agency cross trades).6 
2. Government inspections. Regulated funds are also generally subject to compliance 
examinations, which involve detailed inspections of the fund and its managers by government 
officials. These inspections, which have been suggested to reduce fraud (HF Rule, 2004), vary 
substantially in scope, ranging from simple records requests to onsite exams lasting for several 
weeks. The exams are generally focused on whether the advisor has fulfilled the compliance 
requirements described below, such as record-keeping and proper client communication. While 
the exams may peripherally address the accuracy of the advisor’s Form ADV disclosure, the 
accuracy of this information is not generally the primary focus. Following the exams, most 
advisors receive a deficiency letter and are given the opportunity to address the issues that the SEC 
has uncovered (Abromovitz, 2012). However, some examinations reveal unlawful acts that lead to 
enforcement actions (CBS, 2004). 
3. Compliance requirements. Finally, upon regulation, advisors are generally subject to a 
multitude of compliance requirements. The most notable compliance requirements are that the 
advisor must adopt written compliance policies and procedures, appoint a Chief Compliance 
                                                 
6 Form ADV is the only mandatory public filing for most hedge funds, but some funds may be required to file two 
other forms. First, following the DFA, regulated advisors with over $150 million in US assets under management are 
require to disclose portfolio information on Form PF. This form is not publicly available and is exempt from Freedom 
of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests. Second, advisors with over $100 million in applicable securities will be 
required to disclose equity holdings on Form 13F (this applies even if the advisor is not regulated). However, many 






Officer, maintain books and records for a period of at least five years, adopt a code of ethics, and 
follow strict guidelines on sensitive topics such as performance fees and the use of third-parties to 
solicit new clients. Regulated advisors who have control of their clients’ assets are also generally 
required to either produce audited financials or to have at least one surprise audit each year. 




To evaluate how regulation affected misreporting at hedge funds, I assembled a dataset 
from two key sources. First, I gathered data on the governance of each fund from historical Form 
ADV filings; although these data are generally not publicly available, I obtained them by filing 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests with, among others, the SEC. Second, I pulled 
data on each fund’s returns from the Lipper Hedge Fund database, a commercial database to which 
hedge funds voluntarily report their returns. 
  1. Form ADV. As noted above, Form ADV is the only publicly available mandatory filing 
for most hedge funds and contains important information. Dimmock and Gerken (2012), for 
example, find that investors who avoid the 5% of firms with the highest ex ante fraud risk based 
on Form ADV disclosures can avoid 40% of the dollar losses due to fraud. And Brown et al. (2008, 
2009, 2012) provides evidence that the information in Form ADV filings enables investors to select 






  Despite the apparent utility of Form ADV, this filing has received little attention in academic 
literature—likely because historical Form ADV data are extremely difficult to obtain. The current 
versions of Form ADV are available online, but historical data have traditionally been unavailable 
to academic researchers.7 Moreover, because some advisors are regulated by states and others by 
the SEC, FOIA requests must be filed separately at each regulator. To obtain the data for this 
project, I filed FOIA requests with the SEC and sixteen state securities agencies.8 My original 
request with the SEC was denied, but I later obtained the data after a lengthy appeals process. 
2. Lipper Hedge Fund Database (TASS). I obtained information on hedge funds’ financial 
performance, such as monthly returns, from the Thomson Reuters Lipper Hedge Fund database 
(also known as the Trading Advisor Selection System (“TASS”) database). This database is a 
commercial database to which hedge funds report in order to market themselves to potential 
investors (Agarwal et al., 2013). The Lipper Hedge Fund database is recorded at the fund level, 
whereas Form ADV is filed by the investment advisor. As such, to combine these databases, I 
performed a one-to-many merge. 
 
                                                 
7 To my knowledge, the only academic studies that use time-series Form ADV data use the dataset described by 
Dimmock and Gerken (2012). The authors note in the paper that their Form ADV data were not publicly available. 
8 I filed FOIA requests for historical Form ADV filings at sixteen state securities agencies (CA, CO, CT, FL, GA, IL, 
MA, MD, MN, NJ, NY, OH, PA, TX, VA, and WA). I selected the states by tabulating the percentage of SEC 
registrants located in each state and submitting FOIA requests in all states with 2% or more of total advisors. In total, 
received Form ADV filings for all SEC registrants from 2001-2014 and some Form ADV data for state registrants 
from 2006-2014. I thank Robert Jackson for his very extensive help with the process. The SEC does provide limited 
historical Form ADV filings online, but these data are notoriously poor quality and would not have permitted me to 






B. Research Design 
 
The unusual nature of my setting permits me to consider the effects both of imposing SEC 
oversight and of removing that oversight. All tests use a “difference-in differences” approach. That 
is: I examine the change in misreporting for the funds affected by the change in the law (the 
“treatment” group) relative to the change in misreporting for the funds that were not affected by 
that change in the law (the “control” group). For consistency, I use the standardized methodology 
described below across all tests.  
First, consistent with Dimmock and Gerken (2015), I require each fund included in my 
sample to have thirty months of observations both before and after the relevant change in law. 
Such a lengthy period is necessary in order to identify misreporting. For example, as discussed 
below, one of my measures of misreporting is based on regression estimates, necessitating 
sufficient observations to run a regression. 
Second, I identify the treatment and control samples as follows. If a fund was continually 
subject to SEC regulation during the thirty months before and after the relevant change in law, I 
include it in the control sample.9 If the fund submitted to federal oversight in the six months prior 
to the deadline imposed by the relevant law, I consider it to have become regulated in accordance 
                                                 
9 I used a control sample of funds that were already regulated by the SEC as opposed to foreign funds because there 
were changes in the US regulatory landscape that were unrelated to the legal changes I study here. As one such 
example, the DFA gave the SEC increased authority to pay financial rewards to whistleblowers. This change affected 
both the newly regulated funds and the funds already regulated by the SEC (i.e., the control funds), but may not have 






with the change in law and include in the treatment sample. Funds were required to submit to SEC 
oversight by January 31st, 2006 and by March 31st, 2012 for the Hedge Fund Rule and the DFA, 
respectively, so this period ranges from August 2005–January 2006 for the Hedge Fund Rule and 
from October 2011–March 2012 for the DFA. Funds that do not meet the criteria of either the 
treatment or control sample are dropped from the analysis, and all funds lacking full data in both 
periods are omitted from the analysis so that the sample will not be biased due to attrition. 
For the Hedge Fund Rule and DFA, I use the month the SEC adopted the final rule in 
question as the date of the change in law. These months are December 2004 and June 2011 for the 
Hedge Fund Rule and the DFA, respectively (the month of the change is included in the pre 
period). I select the month of rule adoption because the funds knew at this point that they would 
be regulated, allowing them to prepare for the upcoming changes. For the Court’s opinion in 
Goldstein vacating the Hedge Fund Rule, I use September 2006—the first month in which any of 
the funds withdrew after the SEC stated that it would not appeal the Goldstein opinion in August 
2006—as the date of the relevant change in law, and I compare the 30 months before and after that 
date. The timeline and variable descriptions are summarized in the Appendix. 
4. Measures of Misreporting 
 
The variable of interest for my study, misreporting by hedge funds, is notoriously difficult 
to measure. First, hedge funds have substantial holdings of Level 2 and Level 3 assets. From an 






there is often no clear pricing benchmark. The lack of an objective benchmark is thought to provide 
managers with more discretion in valuation, leading some funds seek to minimize managerial 
discretion through external monitoring such as auditing and independent pricing. Evidence 
suggests that these methods do reduce misreporting, but that they are not foolproof (e.g., Brown 
et al. 2012; Cassar and Gerakos, 2010, 2011). Nor are they universally adopted—one study found 
that managers have full discretion to price assets in almost 20% of funds (Cassar and Gerakos, 
2011).  
Second, it is difficult to identify misreporting because the funds’ portfolio data are not 
publicly available. Instead, academic studies estimate misreporting by identifying suspicious 
patterns in the monthly performance returns that hedge funds report to their investors. This 
approach captures manipulation of the underlying assets because monthly performance returns and 
fund assets are inherently linked: The fund returns are based on the monthly change in net assets, 
before inflows or outflows from investors and after fees, so manipulation of the underlying assets 
will manifest in the monthly returns. As described below, I follow these prior studies and identify 
misreporting using three suspicious patterns in the monthly returns that funds report to their 
investors. 
A. Kink at Zero 
 
First, following prior literature, I test whether a fund appears to misreport its monthly 
returns to avoid reporting a loss—in particular, by reporting fewer monthly returns just below zero 






and Pool, 2009; 2012; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). The intuition is that, absent misreporting, 
monthly returns will follow a smooth and relatively normal distribution over time. Fund managers, 
however, have strong incentives to avoid reporting losses, so they manage monthly reported 
returns so as to turn small losses into small gains. This means that the observations that would 
naturally have fallen into the bucket below zero instead fall into the bucket above zero, thus 
allowing the fund to report a small gain instead of a small loss. Prior empirical work has shown 
that earnings management of this type is associated with fraud. Bollen and Pool (2012), for 
example, found that the size of a fund’s kink is the strongest predictor of detected accounting fraud 
at hedge funds. 
Figure 1 provides the distribution of monthly returns for all funds in TASS from 2000-
2013 and shows that, consistent with this intuition, there is a “kink” in the distribution of fund 
returns at zero. That is, there more than expected gains just above zero. The bin width of 13 basis 








Figure 1. Measure of Misreporting: Kink. This figure describes the distribution of monthly 
hedge fund returns and indicates that, relative to the surrounding bins, there is a significant spike 
in the frequency of fund returns reported in the bin just above zero. The figure is based on all funds 
in the Lipper Hedge Fund database from 2000 to 2013. The bin width of 13 basis points is set 
according to the optimal bin width formula in Silverman (1986).  
 
Although Figure 1 presents evidence using all hedge funds, my research design requires 
that I identify misreporting at each individual fund. To test for a kink at each individual fund, I 
create three bins surrounding zero. The first bin includes monthly returns from -1% to -.50%, the 
second from -.50% to 0%, and the third from 0% to .50% (I use a bin width of 50 basis points 
following the fund-specific measure of discontinuity in Bollen and Pool (2009)). All bins include 
the upper limit. I then test whether the number of observations in the bin just below zero is less 

































































































calculated in accordance with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), and I consider the fund to have 
misreported if the number of observations in the bin below zero is statistically lower than expected 
with a significance level of 5% or greater.  
B. Cookie Jar Accounting  
 
 My second measure of misreporting is based on whether a fund uses so-called “cookie jar” 
accounting—that is, whether the fund accumulates reserves during good times in order to protect 
against bad times. When bad times arise, this practice allows the manager to reach into the “cookie 
jar” to inflate her reported results.  
Prior literature has suggested that one way to test for “cookie jar” accounting at hedge 
funds is to consider whether the fund reports abnormally high returns in December (Agarwal et 
al., 2011). The idea is that funds accumulate reserves in the “cookie jar” throughout the year, and 
if bad times never arise, managers will recognize excess returns remaining in the “cookie jar” in 
December for two reasons. First, managers want these returns to be recognized before the year 
ends for purposes of determining their annual compensation. Second, most hedge fund audits take 
place at the end of the year, so managers are keen to bring their books into compliance before their 
auditors arrive.  
Following Agarwal et al. (2011), Figure 2 shows the average returns for all hedge funds, 
both in the month of December and in non-December months, in all years from 2000-2013. The 
figure shows that average returns in December are higher than average returns for other months in 






Notably, the years in which December returns are lower—2007, 2009, and 2011—are years in 
which “cookie jar” accounting may not have been an option because of the financial crisis and its 
aftershocks. 
 
Figure 2. Measure of Misreporting: Cookie Jar Accounting. This figure describes mean hedge 
fund returns in December and non-December months, and it indicates that mean fund returns in 
December were higher than mean fund returns in other months in ten of the thirteen years from 
2000 to 2013. The figure is based on all funds in the Lipper Hedge Fund database.  
 
To test for “cookie jar” accounting at each individual fund, I regress each fund’s monthly 
returns on the seven hedge fund style factors used Fung and Hsieh (2004), an indicator for the 
month of December, and year fixed effects. The seven hedge fund factors are included in order to 
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misreported if the coefficient on the December indicator variable is significantly positive at the 
5% level or greater. 
C. Benford’s Law  
 
Finally, my third measure of misreporting examines whether the distribution of each fund’s 
monthly returns conforms to Benford’s Law. Benford’s Law states that, when many distributions 
are aggregated together, the first digits in the resulting distribution will follow a specific 
logarithmic curve (Benford, 1938). Benford’s Law specifically predicts that the first digit of 
monthly returns reported by hedge funds should be a one 30.1% of the time, a two 17.6% of the 
time, and so on, with other digits appearing less frequently until nine, which only appears as the 
first digit in 4.6% of all observations.10 The intuition for the law is that the percentage change 
needed to “roll over” (i.e., to increase the first digit) of a fund’s monthly return is greater for lower 
numbers. For example, suppose a fund wants to grow its profits from one million dollars to two 
million dollars. To do so, it must double its profits. But the same fund can increase its profits from 
eight million dollars to nine million dollars by increasing its profits by just 12.5%. Because of 
these differences in the percentage change necessary to “roll over” from lower digits to higher 
ones, the typical fund will spend more time with profits between one and two million dollars than 
                                                 
10 The formula for Benford’s Law is P(d)=log10(1+(1/d)), where d is the first digit and ranges from one to nine. Thus, 
the expected distribution for digits one through nine is 30.1%, 17.6%, 12.5%, 9.7%, 7.9%, 6.7%, 5.8%, 5.1%, and 
4.6%, respectively. As a general rule, Benford’s Law will apply when the distribution of the base-10 log values of the 
original dataset is smooth, symmetrical, and spread across several orders of magnitude in the log scale (Amiran et al. 
2015). To confirm that hedge fund returns will conform to Benford’s Law, I graphed the distribution of the base-10 
log monthly returns. The distribution is approximately normally distributed and ranges across several orders of 






with profits between eight and nine million dollars. Thus, more observations of the fund’s profits 
should begin with one or two than with eight or nine. 
Benford’s Law is widely used to detect financial fraud. Amiran et al. (2015), for example, 
show that deviations from Benford’s Law can be used to predict material misstatements at public 
companies, and Nigrini (1996; 2012) finds that Benford’s Law can be used to detect errors in tax 
and internal financial reporting. Barring unusual events, such as September 11, 2001, stock returns 
also conform to Benford’s Law (Corazza et al., 2010). In the hedge fund context, I found that 38% 
of funds in the Lipper Hedge Fund database that the SEC identified as fraudulent deviated from 
Benford’s Law over the final 30 months of their reporting life. By contrast, only 16% of the general 
population of funds in the database deviated over the same period—a significant difference. 
At a summary level, Figure 3 describes the distribution of the first digit of monthly returns 
(1) that is predicted by Benford’s Law; (2) of the funds in the Lipper Hedge Fund database from 
2000-2013; and (3) of Bernie Madoff’s infamous investment fund. Figure 3 suggests that the vast 
majority of fund returns conform to Benford’s Law. For example, Benford predicts that 30.1% of 
fund returns will start with a one (reflected by the white bar), and the actual distribution shows that 
32.3% start with a one (reflected by the grey bar). By contrast, using a set of returns compiled from 
Blodget (2008), the figure shows a whopping 39.6% of Madoff’s returns started with a one—a 
significant deviation.11  
                                                 








Figure 3. Measure of Misreporting: Benford’s Law. This figure describes the distribution of 
the first digits of monthly hedge fund returns. The white bar indicates the expected distribution 
based on Benford’s Law, the grey bar indicates the actual distribution of based on all monthly 
returns reported to the Lipper Hedge Fund database from 2000-2013, and the black bar indicates 
the distribution based on monthly returns reported by Bernie Madoff’s investment fund. The first 
digits of negative returns are included. 
 
To test for deviations from Benford’s Law at each individual fund, I rely on the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (“KS”) statistic. The KS test is a nonparametric test that relies on the 
maximum deviation from the expected distribution, where the maximum deviation is determined 
by the cumulative deviation at each digit (see Amiran et al., 2015 for a discussion of this issue). I 
consider a fund to have deviated from Benford’s Law if the maximum deviation is significant at 
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My analysis includes all three measures as proxies for misreporting by hedge funds. 
Although the primary results in Tables 3-5 aggregate all measures, Table 9 summarizes these 
results for each proxy individually. 
5. The Effect of Hedge Fund Regulation on Misreporting 
 
As a preliminary inquiry, I ask whether hedge fund regulation reduced misreporting and 
provide evidence that it did. This section presents the descriptive statistics and regression results 
for this inquiry.  
A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
1. Comparison of treatment and control funds. There were more control funds than 
treatment funds in all analyses. The specific numbers are as follows: (1) Hedge Fund Rule – 228 
control funds and 124 treatment funds; (2) DC Circuit’s Goldstein decision – 289 control funds, 
55 funds that withdrew from SEC regulation after the court’s decision, and 102 funds that 
voluntarily remained subject to SEC regulation;12 (3) DFA – 552 control funds and 222 treatment 
funds.13  
                                                 
12 The total number of observations in the analyses of the Hedge Fund Rule and Goldstein differed slightly because of 
data availability in the Lipper Hedge Fund database.  
 
13 Of these 222 treatment funds, 108 were newly subject to full regulation (the others were only subject to partial 
regulation). Out of an abundance of caution, I omitted from the DFA analyses in Tables 3 and 5 all funds that withdrew 
from SEC regulation after Goldstein to ensure that the initial set of tests analyzed comparable funds across all three 






Table 1 describes the fund characteristics. The table shows each fund’s mean monthly 
return, mean log of net asset value, and mean age over the period. I also include the fund’s return 
volatility over the period, whether the fund is incorporated in the US, and the sensitivity of the 
fund to market liquidity. The fund’s sensitivity to liquidity was measured by regressing the fund 
returns over each period on the Sadka (2006) permanent liquidity variable, where the resulting 









  Hedge Fund Rule  Dodd-Frank Act 
Variable  Treat. Control t-stat  Treat. Control t-stat 
Monthly Return  0.94 0.82 3.52  1.06 0.83 3.15 
Ln (Net Asset Value)  5.86 6.28 -4.37  6.37 6.08 2.73 
Age  7.37 7.62 -5.82  7.68 7.83 -3.22 
Return Volatility  2.24 1.81 4.87  3.34 2.53 5.37 
US Incorporation  0.2 0.33 -3.71  0.32 0.3 0.73 
Liquidity Sensitivity  21.17 4.09 -2.26  -27.51 -40.01 -2.00 
Num. Funds  124 228    108 552  
 
Panel B.  
  Goldstein Opinion 
Variable  Withdraw Control T-stat  Withdraw Remain T-stat 
             
Monthly Return  0.36 0.29 1.13  0.36 0.45 -1.26 
Ln (Net Asset Value)  5.61 6.06 -3.64  5.61 6.13 -4.10 
Age  7.60 7.61 -0.96  7.60 7.43 2.80 
Return Volatility  2.99 2.36 4.29  2.99 3.08 -0.48 
US Incorporation  0.13 0.30 -3.85  0.13 0.20 -1.54 
Liquidity Sensitivity  56.46 28.88 3.69  56.46 48.88 0.79 
Num. Funds  55 289    55 102   
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: All Funds. This table provides descriptive statistics for the treatment and 
control funds. Panel A reflects the funds used in the analyses of the Hedge Fund Rule and the Dodd-Frank 
Act (“DFA”). The treatment funds are those that became regulated following the change in law, and the 
control funds are those that were continuously regulated by the SEC throughout the entire period (i.e., funds 
that did not have a change in regulatory status following the change in law). Panel B reflects the sample 
used in the Goldstein analysis and divides the treatment funds into two groups: withdraw and remain. Funds 
that withdrew from SEC regulation are assigned to the withdraw group, and those that remained regulated 







As shown in Table 1, there were significant differences between the treatment and control 
groups across several observable characteristics. Relative to the control sample, the treatment 
funds were significantly younger, more likely to be foreign, had better performance, and had 
greater return volatility. It is for this reason that, when possible, I use two alternate control groups: 
(i) the full sample of eligible control funds, and (ii) a smaller matched sample of control funds.  
To create the matched sample, I rely primarily on the following two restrictions. First, each 
treatment fund must be matched with a control fund that has the same number of “flags” for 
misreporting in the period prior to regulation. Second, US funds must be matched to US funds 
(and non-US funds to non-US funds). Treatment funds without a match along these two criteria 
are dropped. If a fund has multiple potential matches along these criteria, I next match on 
investment style (e.g., long-equity funds will be matched). If a fund still has multiple potential 
matches, I match treatment and control funds with the most similar propensity to be unregulated, 
where the propensity to be unregulated is determined using a probit model. Each probit model 
includes monthly returns, performance, age, return volatility, and sensitivity to liquidity (as 
defined in Table 1). Following these criteria, there are a total of 109 funds in each group in the 
analysis of the Hedge Fund Rule and 101 funds in each group in the analysis of the DFA.  
2. Frequency of misreporting. As explained previously, drawing on previous literature, I 






I consider it a “flag” for misreporting.14 Table 2 presents the frequency of “flags” at the treatment 
and control funds before and after regulation. Panel A presents the average number of flags per 
fund for the full sample, Panel B breaks down the results for the full sample by proxy, and Panel 
C presents the average number of flags per fund for the matched sample. 
As a general pattern, the frequency of misreporting at the treatment group decreased 
relative to the control group. For example, 14% of funds that became regulated in response to the 
DFA had a statistically significant kink prior to regulation, whereas only 8% of the control funds 
had such a kink. In the period following regulation, the percentage of funds with a kink did not 
significantly differ between the two groups (9% and 8% for the control and treatment funds, 
respectively).  
However, in some instances, it appears that the relative decrease in misreporting by the 
treatment funds is driven by an increase in misreporting at the control funds rather than a decrease 
at the treatment funds. On the one hand, changes in the frequency of flags is expected because 
misreporting by hedge funds varies significantly with economic cycles. For example, as noted 
previously, the only years in which mean fund returns in December were lower than mean fund 
returns in other months were 2007, 2009, and 2011, presumably because cookie jar accounting 
                                                 
14 I treat misreporting as binary and record only whether the fund deviated from the expected distribution in the 
predicted direction of misreporting—not the severity of the deviation. I follow this approach because not all deviations 
are equal. For example, if a fund has a significant positive kink above zero, I would consider that misreporting. 
However, if a firm has a significant negative kink above zero, I have no theoretical explanation for why such a kink 






was not an option due to the Financial Crisis and its aftershocks. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that the control funds increased misreporting after regulation—possibly due to the 
“constrained cop” theory stating that actors are more likely to misbehave when they know the 
“cop” (i.e., the SEC) is distracted (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). If so, perhaps Table 2 provides 
evidence that regulation actually increased reporting. 
 To better identify whether movement was occurring at the treatment or control funds, I 
looked at misreporting by foreign funds, where foreign funds are defined as all funds in the Lipper 
Hedge Fund database that are located outside the US and do not file Form ADV (as before, the 
funds must report throughout the entire relevant period). Notably, the trend in misreporting at the 
foreign funds appears similar to that at the control funds (I confirm that the trend is statistically 
equivalent in the robustness section). Following the Hedge Fund Rule, foreign and control funds 
both significantly increased misreporting, whereas misreporting at the treatment funds remained 
constant. And, following the DFA, there was no significant difference in misreporting at the 
control and foreign funds, whereas the treatment funds decreased misreporting. Because the 
control funds follow the same trend as unaffected foreign funds, it appears that the relative decrease 









 Number of Flags – Full Sample 
 Hedge Fund Rule  Dodd-Frank Act 
 Control Treat. Foreign  Control Treat. Foreign 
Before Regulation 0.33 0.43 0.40  0.54 0.65 0.68 
After Regulation 0.61 0.44 0.61  0.56 0.31 0.63 
t-tests (before vs. after) -4.32 -0.22 -3.81  -0.50 4.19 1.08 
 
Panel B. 
    Flags by Proxy – Hedge Fund Rule 
 Before Regulation  After Regulation 
 Control Treat. Foreign  Control Treat. Foreign 
Kink 0.10 0.15 0.15  0.21 0.14 0.20 
Cookie Jar 0.07 0.13 0.08  0.19 0.11 0.20 
Benford's Law 0.16 0.15 0.17  0.21 0.20 0.21 
 
    Flags by Proxy – Dodd-Frank Act 
 Before Regulation  After Regulation 
 Control Treat. Foreign  Control Treat. Foreign 
Kink 0.08 0.14 0.22  0.09 0.08 0.19 
Cookie Jar 0.31 0.36 0.30  0.34 0.13 0.27 















 Number of Flags – Matched Sample 
 Hedge Fund Rule  Dodd-Frank Act 
 Control Treat.   Control Treat.  
Before Regulation 0.33 0.33   0.58 0.58  
After Regulation 0.66 0.43   0.45 0.30  
t-tests (before vs. after) -3.85 -1.32   1.60 3.46  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Frequency of Flags for Misreporting. This table provides descriptive 
statistics on the frequency of “flags” for misreporting at the treatment and control funds. Panels A and B 
use the full sample and Panel C includes only the matched sample. Panels A and C reflect the aggregate 
number of flags, and Panel B presents the disaggregated results for each flag individually. The treatment 
funds are those that became regulated in accordance with the change in law, the control funds are those that 
were continuously regulated by the SEC throughout the entire 60-month period surrounding the change in 
law, and foreign funds are defined as funds located outside the US that do not file Form ADV. 
 
B. Regression Results 
 
Below I present the results of the difference-in-differences regressions showing that 
regulation reduced misreporting by hedge funds. The dependent variable reflects the number of 
flags triggered. The results are presented first using the full sample of funds and then using the 
matched sample. I present the analysis (1) using fixed effects for each fund’s country of 
incorporation and investment style, and (2) using fund fixed effects.15 All tests control for the 
variables noted in Table 1, and standard errors are clustered by fund. 
1. Imposition of federal regulation. Using the equation below, I compare the change in 
misreporting at the treatment funds relative to the change in misreporting at the control funds after 
                                                 
15 The New Fund variable—and all derivatives thereof, such as the Remain and Withdraw variables in Table 4—is 
omitted from the regressions that include fund fixed effects because the New Fund dummy is collinear with the fund 







the two legal developments that subjected treatment funds to federal regulation: The adoption of 
the Hedge Fund Rule in 2004 and the adoption of the SEC rules implementing the DFA in 2011. 
The Post variable is set to one in the period after the rule was adopted and to zero in the period 
before. The New Fund variable is set to one for all treatment funds and to zero for all control funds. 
The variable of interest is the interaction term between these two variables. 
 
 
As shown in Table 3, the interaction term is negative and statistically significant in all 
models, indicating that misreporting decreased for the newly regulated funds. Although I present 
the results using ordinal logit models, I run unreported OLS models to better capture the economic 
magnitude of the effect. The OLS models also show a significant decrease in misreporting. For 
example, following the adoption of the Hedge Fund Rule, the mean fund subjected to regulation 
triggered roughly 0.25 to 0.40 fewer flags than would have been expected based on the control 
sample (estimates vary based across the models). The economic significance for the DFA is 
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Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Char. Fund Char. Fund 
Observations 722 722 436 436 
R-squared 0.09 0.50 0.09 0.53 
 
Panel B. Dodd-Frank Act 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 

























Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Char. Fund Char Fund 
Observations 1,322 1,322 404 404 








Table 3. Regression Results: Mandatory Regulation. Difference-in-differences regressions show that the 
funds subjected to SEC regulation significantly decreased misreporting relative to the control funds. Panel 
A shows the analysis for the Hedge Fund Rule, and Panel B shows the analysis for the Dodd-Frank Act. 
All models control for each fund’s mean monthly return, mean log of net asset value, and mean age over 
the period. I also control for the fund’s return volatility over the period, whether the fund was incorporated 
in the US, and the sensitivity of the fund to market liquidity. The fund’s sensitivity to liquidity was measured 
by regressing the fund returns over each period on the Sadka (2006) permanent liquidity variable, and the 
resulting beta on the Sadka variable was then included as a control. Fixed effects are included either for the 
fund’s country of incorporation and investment style (fixed effects for fund characteristics, “Char.”) or for 
the fund itself (“Fund”). Standard errors are clustered by fund. For the Hedge Fund Rule, the Post variable 
is set to 1 in the 30 months after December 2004, when the SEC adopted the Hedge Fund Rule, and to 0 in 
the 30 months before the Rule was adopted. For the Dodd-Frank Act, the Post variable is set to 1 in the 30 
months after July 2011, when the SEC adopted the rules to implement the DFA, and to 0 in the 30 months 
before the rules were adopted. The variable New Fund is set to 1 for the newly regulated funds, and to 0 for 
all funds that were continuously regulated by the SEC throughout the entire sample period. All models are 
run using ordinal logit models, but the results are consistent using OLS. The dependent variable reflects the 
number of flags triggered. Models (1) and (2) use the full sample of funds, and Models (3) and (4) use the 
matched sample. Statistical significance of 10, 5, and 1 percent is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Although the decrease in misreporting for the full sample appears greater after the DFA 
than the Hedge Fund Rule, it is interesting to note that the magnitude of the decrease in 
misreporting is more similar using the matched sample. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence 
that there was a selection effect in the funds that submitted to regulation in accordance with the 
Hedge Fund Rule; some funds did not submit to oversight because they were waiting on the 
outcome of the court decision. 
To summarize, this evidence suggests that the imposition of federal regulation reduced 
misreporting at hedge funds. I cannot rule out, however, the possibility that the timing of these 
regulatory changes happened to coincide with a decrease in misreporting that would have occurred 






2. Removal of federal regulation. After the DC Circuit vacated the Hedge Fund Rule in 
the Goldstein case, funds that had been subjected to regulation were given a choice; they could 
voluntarily remain subject to federal regulation or elect to opt out. I divide these funds into two 
groups: (1) Those that chose to remain subject federal oversight (“Remain”), and (2) those that 
chose to exit the federal regulatory regime (“Withdraw”). In the equation below, Remain is set to 
one if the fund submitted to oversight in accordance with the Hedge Fund Rule and remained 
regulated, and Withdraw is to set one if the fund submitted to oversight in accordance with the 
Hedge Fund Rule and withdrew post-Goldstein. Both are set to zero for the control funds. As stated 
previously, I consider a newly regulated fund to have withdrawn if the fund withdrew after the 
SEC announced, in August 2006, that it would not appeal the Goldstein case and before February 
1, 2007—the deadline to withdraw without penalty after Goldstein. The Post variable is set to zero 
for the thirty months leading to September 2006—the first month in which any of the funds in my 
sample withdrew from SEC regulation—and to one in the thirty months after September 2006. The 
primary variables of interest are the interaction terms between Post and Withdraw and Post and 
Remain, which reflect the change in misreporting for the funds that withdrew (remained) after 
Goldstein relative to the change in misreporting for the control funds during the same period.16 
 
 
                                                 
16 Going forward, I do not include the matched sample because there are more than two groups of funds. I include 
alternate robustness tests in the final section, however. 
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Table 4 shows that, post-Goldstein, the funds that withdrew from federal oversight 
increased misreporting relative to the control funds. The interaction term between Post and 
Withdraw is positive and statistically significant at 10% in all models. Although statistical 
significance in this table is lower than in the prior two tables, the treatment group has been 
partitioned into two groups, thereby reducing statistical power. By contrast, the funds that 
remained subject to federal regulation did not, after Goldstein, experience a significant change in 
misreporting relative to the control funds. This suggests that the initial decrease in misreporting 
was sticky—after regulation, misreporting at the treatment funds remained at the relatively lower 
level. Taken together with the evidence on the effects of the Hedge Fund Rule and the DFA, these 



































Controls Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Char. Fund 
Observations 892 892 
R-squared 0.05 0.55 
Table 4. Regression Results: Funds that Withdrew from Regulation. Difference-in-differences 
regressions show that, after the Hedge Fund Rule was vacated, the funds that withdrew from federal 
regulation significantly increased misreporting relative to the control funds. All models include the control 
variables and fixed effects noted in Table 3. Standard errors are clustered by fund. The Post variable is set 
to 1 in the 30 months after September 2006, when the first funds in my sample withdrew from SEC 
oversight, and to 0 in the 30 months before September 2006. The variable Withdraw is set to 1 for all funds 
that became regulated in accordance with the Hedge Fund Rule and later withdrew after it was vacated, and 
to 0 for all other funds. The variable Remain was set to 1 for all funds that became regulated in accordance 
with the Hedge Fund Rule and remained regulated after it was vacated, and to 0 for all other funds. The 
control funds are those that were continuously regulated by the SEC throughout the entire sample period. 
All models are run using ordinal logit models, but the results are consistent using OLS. The dependent 
variable reflects the number of flags triggered. Statistical significance of 10, 5, and 1 percent is indicated 









6. Disentangling the Effect of Different Regulatory Components 
 
Having provided evidence that the legal changes I examine here reduced hedge fund 
misreporting, I now turn to a separate question: why did these changes to the law reduce 
misreporting? As noted earlier, the imposition of federal regulation subjects funds to multiple 
regulatory elements. The decrease in misreporting could be caused by any one of these elements 
individually or by their interaction.  
A. Background 
 
Recall that, as noted in Section 2, the DFA made significant changes to federal law on 
hedge fund regulation. As described below, these changes effectively created three groups of hedge 
funds by subjecting different funds to different types of regulation.  
 Full Regulation. First, as noted previously, the DFA subjected the majority of unregulated funds 
to full regulation—these were the funds studied in Table 3 above. These funds, known as 
Registered Investment Advisers (RIAs), became subject to mandatory disclosure rules, 
government inspections, and compliance requirements. Unless a fund is eligible for one of the 
categories below, it will fall into this group by default. 
 Disclosure-only. Second, in an effort to reduce the costs associated with hedge fund regulation, 
a subset of funds was exempted from the vast majority of regulatory requirements—these funds 
only became subject to mandatory public disclosure (i.e., they had to file Form ADV). These 
firms, known as Exempt Reporting Advisers (ERAs), were eligible for exempt status because 






$150 million of US assets.17 Because of the asset limitation, most ERAs are foreign. Although 
US advisors must have less than $150 million in total—a relatively small sum for an advisory 
firm—foreign advisors need only have less than $150 million from US investors.  
 Inspection-only. Third, the DFA subjected a group of funds to SEC inspections. These funds 
were already complying with disclosure rules and compliance requirements—but were not yet 
subject to SEC inspections. The funds in this third group were regulated by a state prior to the 
DFA, but were required to switch to SEC regulation because of a requirement in the DFA that, 
subject to limited exceptions, advisors with more than $100 million in assets were required to 
be regulated by the SEC rather than a state.18  
The outcome of these changes was that the DFA created three groups of hedge funds, all 
subject to different changes in regulation. This allows for study of the different regulatory 
components in isolation. However, I note the caveat that funds were not randomly selected for 
each group. On average, relative to the funds subject to full regulation, the disclosure-only funds 
were smaller, more likely to be foreign, had lower returns, and had less return volatility. And the 
inspection-only funds were younger, more likely to be incorporated in the US, and had higher 
                                                 
17 State registered ERAs file the full Form ADV and SEC registered ERAs file a portion of Form ADV. ERAs are not 
required to file Form PF. Congress exempted these funds from the vast majority of the compliance requirements of 
the IAA, and the SEC exempted these funds from its inspection program.  
 
18 These funds were already subject to state inspections before the DFA, but I consider them to be “inspection-only” 
funds because almost all the funds in my sample switched from New York—a state that did not conduct inspections—
and therefore became subject to compliance exams for the first time upon their switch to the SEC’s regulatory regime. 
Each state sets its own compliance requirements, and there are some differences between federal and state compliance 






returns than the funds subject to full regulation. I address these sample selection concerns in the 
robustness tests in Section 7. 
B. Isolating the Regulatory Components  
 
To disentangle the different components of regulation, I partition the funds that became 
subject to federal oversight following the DFA into the three groups previously described. I then 
conduct difference-in-differences tests to compare the change in misreporting for each of the three 
groups relative to the control funds. The time period, control funds, and control variables are the 
same as those used for the DFA tests in Table 3.  
 
 
The results, presented in Table 5, offer important insights about misreporting at these three 
groups of funds before the DFA. If we consider misreporting in the 30 months before the DFA, 
we see that the level of misreporting at the two groups of funds that were not subject to federal 
disclosure rules was statistically greater than the control funds and statistically comparable to one 
another (unreported F-tests indicate that the full-regulation funds and the disclosure-only funds are 
not statistically significantly different from each other).  Moreover, the level of misreporting at the 
third group of funds—inspection-only funds—was not statistically different from misreporting at 
the control funds (confirmed by unreported F-tests). 
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Controls Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Char. Fund 
Observations 1,498 1,498 
R-squared 0.09 0.48 
Table 5. Regression Results: Misreporting and Type of Regulation. Difference-in-differences 
regressions show that the funds that became subject to full regulation and those that became subject to only 
disclosure rules significantly decreased misreporting relative to the control funds. The time period, control 
group, and conrol variables are the same as those used for the DFA tests in Table 3. Standard errors are 
clustered by fund. The variable Full Reg. was set to 1 for all funds that became subject to full regulation, 
and to 0 otherwise. The variable Disc. Only was set to 1 for all funds that became subject to only disclosure 
rules, and to 0 otherwise. The variable Inspect. Only was set to 1 for all funds that became subject to only 
a change in inspections, and to 0 otherwise. All models are run using ordinal logit models, but the results 
are consistent using OLS. The dependent variable reflects the number of flags triggered. Statistical 
significance of 10, 5, and 1 percent is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
As for the more intriguing question of how misreporting changed after the DFA, Table 5 
provides evidence that mandatory disclosure, even on its own, can reduce misreporting at hedge 






change in law, as did those subjected to full regulation (F-tests comparing the coefficients from 
Table 5 show that decreases in misreporting for these two groups were statistically equivalent). By 
contrast, the inspection-only funds exhibited no significant change in misreporting relative to the 
control funds.19  
 This result is perhaps surprising. Hedge fund investors are generally considered to be 
highly sophisticated, and Brown et al. (2008) provided evidence that many—presumably most—
hedge fund investors already had access to the information in Form ADV before mandatory 
regulation. Moreover, the information in Form ADV is related to the advisor’s governance, not its 
financial performance. 
C. Disclosure Mechanism  
 
To understand why disclosure of governance information reduced misreporting, I engaged 
in a two-step process. First, I reached out to hedge fund compliance officers and other practitioners 
at the funds in my sample to ask for their perspective. Second, I ran additional empirical tests to 
capture the anecdotal feedback.  
1. Anecdotal evidence. My inquiries provided helpful anecdotal evidence outlining two 
possible mechanisms through which the imposition of governance disclosure requirements may 
have reduced misreporting. First, upon being required to publicly disclose whether they conformed 
                                                 
19 There are multiple explanations for this result. While possible that inspections do not deter misreporting, it is also 
possible that the analysis lacks power because I have only a limited sample of funds in this category. As such, I hesitate 






to best practices, funds indicated that they became more likely to conform to best practices. For 
example, rather than publicly disclose that the fund was not audited regularly by an independent 
public accountant, some fund managers hired such an auditor. The funds appeared to be more 
concerned with how prospective investors—rather than current investors—would view the 
information. Second, many respondents indicated that chief compliance officers enjoyed increased 
status upon SEC regulation. Some funds appointed compliance officers for the first time.20  And 
funds that already had compliance officers were often thought to place a greater value on the 
officer’s input following regulation.  
2. Empirical analysis. In sum, anecdotal evidence suggests that the disclosure 
requirements decreased misreporting by spurring internal governance changes. These governance 
changes, in turn, induced funds to report their financial performance more accurately. Although 
this explanation is intuitive, it is difficult to test empirically because very little information is 
available on funds’ internal governance prior to regulation. The commercial databases are largely 
focused on funds’ financial performance, not their governance.  
However, the Lipper Hedge Fund database includes a field noting the last official audit 
date for each fund. Using historical information for this field, I identified the funds that initiated 
audit procedures following regulation. I then partitioned the newly regulated funds into two 
                                                 
20 The funds that became subject to the full regulation were required to have a compliance officer. However, the 
disclosure-only firms were exempt from this requirement—they were only required to indirectly disclose whether they 






groups—those that initiated audit procedures and those that did not—and tested whether the funds 
that initiated audit procedures following regulation had greater decreases in misreporting than 
funds that did not. Using the equation below, I compare the two groups of newly regulated funds 
to the control funds.  
 
 
The results, shown in Table 6, support the theory that the decrease in misreporting 
following regulation was driven by changes in governance. Following the Hedge Fund Rule, 
unreported OLS models indicate that the funds that initiated audit procedures triggered roughly 
0.34 fewer flags than would have been expected based on the control funds over the same period. 
By comparison, the funds that did not change their audit procedures did not have a significant 
change in misreporting relative to the control funds. Although the pattern is less pronounced 
following the DFA—indeed, the group of funds that initiated audit procedures and the group that 
did not both experienced statistically significant relative decreases in misreporting after 
regulation—this is not surprising.  Funds can make any number of governance changes, and it is 
likely that the funds that did not initiate audit procedures made other unobservable changes in 
behavior.  
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Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Char. Fund Char. Char. 
Observations 722 722 1,516 1,516 
R-squared 0.09 0.51 0.09 0.49 
Table 6. Regression Results: Auditing and Misreporting. Difference-in-differences regressions show 
that the newly regulated funds that initiated audit procedures significantly decreased misreporting relative 
to the control funds. The time period, control group, and conrol variables are the same as those used in 
Table 3. Standard errors are clustered by fund.  The variable Initiate Audit was set to 1 for all newly 
regulated funds that initiated audit procedures following regulation, and to 0 otherwise. The variable No 
Change in Audit was set to 1 for all newly regulated funds that did not initiate audit procedures following 
regulation, and to 0 otherwise. All models are run using ordinal logit models, but the results are consistent 
using OLS. The dependent variable reflects the number of flags triggered. All models use the full sample 
of funds. Statistical significance of 10, 5, and 1 percent is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
   
Despite obvious limitations, this analysis provides important empirical evidence that is 
consistent with anecdotal evidence that the hedge fund disclosure requirements spurred funds to 
make internal governance changes, thus inducing them to report more accurately. Such findings 






Linck et al. (2009) showed that the requirement that public companies disclose whether a 
“financial expert” sits on the company’s audit committee led to a doubling of the number of those 
experts on audit committees, and Chatterji and Toffel (2010) showed that public disclosure of 
firms’ poor environmental records led those firms to subsequently improve their performance. The 
result is also consistent with experimental studies finding subtle but powerful psychological 
dynamics triggered by disclosure requirements (Guttentag et al., 2008). Based on recent literature 
indicating that riskier funds provide their investors with less voluntary disclosure related to fund 
risk (Cassar et al., 2016), it is also possible that the disclosures on Form ADV were more important 




 Despite the benefits of the setting, the research design raises some concerns (e.g., sample 
selection issues). The robustness tests below are designed to address these concerns as best 
possible. 
A. Non-randomness of Treatment Funds 
 
Although the evidence in Table 5 indicates that the funds subject to full regulation and 
those subject to the disclosure-only regime had statistically equivalent decreases in misreporting, 
the assignment of funds to these different types of regulation was not random. The assignments 






$100 and $150 million in US assets generally have the choice to be subject to the disclosure-only 
or full-regulation regime. To address the possible selection bias resulting from this setting, I took 
the steps described below.  
1. Matched sample. First, I created a matched sample of funds from the disclosure-only 
and full-regulation groups. As before, all funds must have the same number of flags for 
misreporting in the period prior to regulation, and US funds are matched to US funds (and non-US 
to non-US). If multiple funds meet these criteria, preference is given to funds with the same 
investment strategy. If there are still multiple potential matches available, funds are matched based 
on their propensity to be a full-regulation fund as opposed to a disclosure-only fund, where the 
propensity is based on a probit model that includes the fund’s mean monthly return, volatility, age, 
size, and sensitivty to liquidity. After applying these filters, I have 50 disclosure-only funds and 
50 full-regulation funds. As shown in Panel A of Table 7, the mean number of flags for the matched 
sample was the same prior to regulation and comparable after regulation. Panel B of Table 7 tests 
the difference more formally by presenting difference-in-difference regressions comparing 
misreporting between these groups. The analysis again shows that the decrease in misreporting 












                      Dodd-Frank Act 
  Disclosure-Only Full-Regulation 
Before Regulation  0.46 0.46 
After Regulation  0.28 0.30 
























Controls Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Char. Fund 
Observations 200 200 
R-squared 0.21 0.71 
Table 7. Robustness: Matching based on Type of Regulation. This analysis matches funds that became 
subject to only disclosure rules with funds that became subject to full regulation. Panel A provides 
descriptive statistics for the matched sample, and Panel B provides difference-in-difference regressions 
comparing the change in misreporting for the treatment and control funds. The time period and control 
variables are the same as those used in the DFA tests in Table 3. Standard errors are clustered by fund. The 
variable Disc. Only was set to 1 for all funds that became subject to only disclosure rules, and to 0 for all 
the funds subject to full regulation. The variable of interest, Post*Disc. Only, is not statistically significant 
in any of the models, indicating that both groups had statistically equivalent decreases in misreporting. The 
dependent variable reflects the number of flags triggered. Statistical significance of 10, 5, and 1 percent is 







2. Quasi-discontinuity analysis. Second, I use a quasi-discontinuity analysis to compare 
those funds that were eligible for the disclosure-only regime with those that were almost eligible. 
Because disclosure-only advisors must have between $100 and $150 million in US assets, I 
compared these funds to the full-regulation funds that are managed by advisors with $150 to $200 
million in assets. The idea behind this test is that the advisors with just over and just under $150 
million should be very similar—but that only those with less than $150 million were eligible for 
the disclosure only regime. Differences in the nature of this cutoff for foreign advisors made it 
impossible to reliably determine which foreign advisors were eligible for disclosure-only 
treatment, so I limited the sample in this test to US advisors with between $100 million and $200 
million in assets.21 The resulting sample is limited, but I include the results for completeness. The 
results, shown in Table 8, provide further confidence that the decrease in misreporting for these 
two groups was statistically equivalent.  
  
                                                 
21 Foreign advisors are eligible for the disclosure-only regime if they have less than $150 million in assets from US 
investors (“US assets”). But advisors only disclose total assets, not US assets. As such, for foreign advisors, the 




























Controls Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Fund Style Fund 
Observations 98 98 
R-squared 0.22 0.62 
Table 8. Robustness: Quasi-discontinuity Design. This table compares the disclosure-only and full-
regulation funds, but uses only funds that were close to the eligibility threshold for the disclosure-only 
regime. Funds are eligible for the SEC’s disclosure-only regime if the fund advisor has $100-$150 million 
in US assets. If the fund advisor has more than $150 million in US assets, the fund is automatically subject 
to full regulation. Hence, the variable Below Threshold was set to 1 for all funds that became subject to 
only disclosure rules, and to 0 for all funds that just missed the eligibility threshold—that is, funds managed 
by advisers with assets under management from $150 million to $200 million. Only US based funds are 
included. The analysis indicates that both groups had statistically equivalent decreases in misreporting. The 
time period and control variables are the same as those used in the DFA tests in Table 3. Standard errors 
are clustered by fund. All models are run using ordinal logit models, but the results are consistent using 
OLS. The dependent variable reflects the number of flags triggered. Statistical significance of 10, 5, and 1 
percent is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
B. Non-Randomness of Control Sample 
 
 By definition, the control funds used in the primary analysis were not chosen at random. 
They were chosen because they had no change in their regulatory status following the changes in 
law—this does not necessarily mean, however, that they were unaffected by the regulation. Indeed, 






have actually increased misreporting following regulation, because they knew the SEC was likely 
to be distracted by the newly regulated funds (Kedia and Rajgopal 2011).  
To formally test for evidence of the constrained cop theory, I run placebo tests comparing 
the changes in misreporting at the control funds relative to the changes in misreporting at foreign 
funds. All tests, which use the same time period and control variables described previously, 
compare the control funds used in the primary analysis with the full set of foreign funds in the 
Lipper Hedge Fund database, where foreign funds are defined as those located outside the US that 
do not file Form ADV. Although I do not report the results for concision, I find that the change in 
misreporting for foreign and control funds was comparable following both the Hedge Fund Rule 
and the DFA. These placebo tests thus provide no evidence that control funds changed 
misreporting in response to the change in law.  
C. Inherent Limitations 
 
 Finally, I note two methodological limitations to my analysis. First, because I studied the 
change in misreporting at the funds newly subject to federal oversight, I omitted funds that evaded 
the federal regulatory regime. Second, my analysis is based on proxies for misreporting, not actual 
incidences of misreporting. 
1. Regulatory avoidance. Prior work has found evidence that some firms evade mandatory 
federal regulation (e.g., Leuz et al., 2008; Bushee and Leuz, 2005), and evasion is a particular 
concern for hedge funds (Greenspan, 1998). Because Greenspan specifically noted that hedge 






whether funds relocated around the time of the legal changes. Although I found no evidence that 
funds engaged in systematic relocation to avoid regulation, I cannot rule out the possibility that 
funds may have opted out of the regulation using other means. For example, in certain 
circumstances, funds could evade these changes in law by altering the “lockup” period that 
investors must observe before withdrawing their funds. I note, however, that prior literature found 
that only 0.5% of domestic funds and 2% of offshore funds changed their lockup periods to evade 
the Hedge Fund Rule (Aragon et al., 2014). 
2. Proxies for misreporting. My analysis is based on proxies for misreporting, not 
incidences of detected misreporting. I analyzed proxies for misreporting for two reasons. First, 
even if the frequency of misreporting is constant, regulation—and government inspections in 
particular—raises the probability than misreporting will be detected (CBS, 2004). Because the 
baseline level of detection has changed, comparing the change in enforcement actions before and 
after regulation is problematic. Second, the frequency of detected fraud at hedge funds is very low, 
especially in the beginning of my sample period. In 2003, for example, the SEC brought a total of 
six enforcement actions against hedge funds.  
There are limitations to the use of proxies, however, and it would be concerning if the 
results using different proxies were inconsistent with one another. To test for consistency, Table 9 






consistently significant findings. By contrast, the flag for cookie jar accounting, when significant, 
results in the most statistically significant findings.22 
  
                                                 
22 Consistent with the results in the primary analysis, none of the individual flags for misreporting are significant for 








 Kink at Zero Cookie Jar Accounting Benford's Law 
 
Fund Characteristics Fixed Effects 
Hedge Fund Rule 10% 1% Not. Sig. 
DC Circuit Opinion – 
Withdraw 
5% Not. Sig. 15% 
Dodd-Frank Act 1% 1% 10% 
 Fund Fixed Effects 
Hedge Fund Rule 10% 5% Not. Sig. 
DC Circuit Opinion – 
Withdraw 
10% Not. Sig. 15% 
Dodd-Frank Act 5% 1% 15% 
 
Panel B. 
  Kink at Zero Cookie Jar Accounting Benford's Law 
 Fund Characteristics Fixed Effects 
Disclosure-only Funds 15% 5% 10% 
Full Regulation Funds 10% 1% Not. Sig. 
Inspection-only Funds Not. Sig. Not. Sig. Not. Sig. 
 Fund Fixed Effects 
Disclosure-only Funds 5% 5% 15% 
Full Regulation Funds 10% 1% Not. Sig. 
Inspection-only Funds Not. Sig. Not. Sig. Not. Sig. 
Table 9. Robustness: Results by Proxy. This table presents the results for each measure of misreporting 
separately. Panel A replicates Tables 3 and 4, and Panel B replicates Table 5. The table reports the statistical 
significance of the coefficient on the variable of interest when the dependent variable reflects only the proxy 
in question. In each panel, the first set of results reports the results using fixed effects for fund 
characteristics, and the second set of results reports the results using fund fixed effects. Consistent with the 
results reported earlier, all statistically significant coefficients are negative.  
8. Conclusion 
 






significantly reduced misreporting by hedge funds. The finding that the imposition of mandatory 
disclosure, even without other concurrent changes in regulation, reduced misreporting by hedge 
funds is perhaps surprising given that hedge fund investors are generally considered to be highly 
sophisticated individuals who already have access to the information in question. To understand 
why mandated disclosure of governance information would lead to this decrease in misreporting, 
I conduct additional analysis that leads me to conclude that the disclosure rules spurred funds to 
make internal changes in governance, ultimately inducing them to report their financial 
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Theoretical Definition Empirical Definition 
   




Funds that became regulated by the Hedge 
Fund Rule. 
 
Previously unregistered funds that 
registered with the SEC at any point from 
August 2005–January 2006. 
 
Control Funds Funds not affected by the Hedge Fund 
Rule. 
Funds continuously registered with the 
SEC in the months from June 2002 
through May 2007. 
   







Funds that elected to withdraw from SEC 
regulation after the Hedge Fund Rule was 
vacated. 
 
Funds that registered in accordance with 
the Hedge Fund Rule and withdrew at any 
point between the day the SEC decided 
not to appeal the court's decision and Jan. 
31st, 2007 (the deadline to withdraw 
without penalty). 
 
Remain Funds Funds that elected to remain regulated 
even after the Hedge Fund Rule was 
vacated. 
Funds that registered in accordance with 
the Hedge Fund Rule and remained 
registered through March 2009. 
 
Control Funds Funds not affected by the Goldstein 
decision. 
Funds continuously registered with the 
SEC in the months from March 2004 
through March 2009. 
 
Regulatory Event September 2006: the first month in which any of the funds in my sample withdrew after 


















Funds that became subject to full 
regulation by the DFA. The initial tests 
only include Full-Regulation funds (see 
below) so that the DFA analysis will be 




Previously unregistered funds that 
registered as Registered Investment 
Advisers with the SEC at any point from 
October 2011–March 2012. 
Control Funds Funds not affected by the DFA. Funds continuously registered with the 
SEC in the months from Jan. 2009 
through Dec. 2013. 
   
Full-Regulation Funds Funds that became subject to full SEC 
regulation (i.e., mandatory disclosure, 
government inspections, and compliance 
requirements).  
Previously unregistered funds that 
registered as Registered Investment 
Advisers with the SEC at any point from 
October 2011–March 2012. 
 
Disclosure-only Funds Funds that only became subject to the 
SEC's public disclosure requirements (i.e., 
funds that had to file Form ADV for the 
first time). 
Previously unregistered funds that 
registered as Exempt Reporting Advisers 
(ERAs) with the SEC at any point before 
March 31st, 2012. As relevant to my 
study, a fund is eligible for ERA status if 
it advises only private funds with less 
than $150M in US assets (i.e., a US 
adviser can only have up to $150M in 
assets, whereas a foreign adviser can only 
have up to $150M in assets from US 
investors). 
   
Inspection-only Funds Funds that only became subject to SEC 
inspections (i.e., funds that were already 
filing Form ADV and subject to state 
compliance requirements, but were not 
subject to government inspections). 
Funds with over $100M that were 
previously registered as a Registered 
Investment Adviser with a state securities 
agency but switched to SEC registration 
at any point from October 2011–March 
2012. Subject to limited exception, the 
DFA mandated that advisers with $100M 
or more be regulated by the SEC, not a 
state agency. As a practical matter, most 
of the funds in my sample that meet this 
definition switched from New York, a 
state that does not conduct compliance 
examinations. 
  
Regulatory Event The SEC's adoption of the rules to enact the relevant parts of the DFA (June 2011). 
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